Employment tribunals, originally called industrial tribunals, were established fifty years ago in Great Britain and this article traces their gradual change. Originally constituted as administrative tribunals in 1964, they morphed to party versus party forums from the 1970s, but this gradual change did not stop there. Over the succeeding years, employment tribunals moved from a marginal role to a central role in British employment relations, as their caseload has risen, their remit has widened, and as legal regulation has replaced collective regulation.
Introduction
Employment tribunals, originally called industrial tribunals, were established fifty years ago in Great Britain and this article traces their development. Originally constituted as administrative tribunals, they morphed to party versus party forums from the 1970s. Over the succeeding years there has been steady incremental change and employment tribunals have moved from a marginal role to a central role in British employment relations, as their caseload has risen, their remit has widened, and as legal regulation has replaced collective regulation. As a result, employment tribunals have become more legalistic and courts in all but name: that is they have become juridified.
This article first considers the concept of juridification. After reviewing the employment relations background, it then examines employment tribunals' first decade, after which it traces their development organising this material according to the yardsticks applied to tribunals more generally: expedition, accessibility, informality, expertise and expense. It then considers another relevant matter, enforcement, before concluding that the history of employment tribunals exemplifies juridification and that the self-help/complainant approach, which is the basis of the British employment tribunal system, seems to have been accepted without any consideration of an alternative enforcement approach that is a state constituted labour inspectorate.
Juridification
The argument of this article is that over the last 50 years employment tribunals have become barely distinguishable from the courts, essentially because of juridification and the steps that the government has taken to make users pay. Heery and Noon 1 define juridification as the process of increasing legal intervention in the employment relationship, but as Simitis 2 points out, this consists not only of increases in employment legislation; the influence of the courts also contributes to juridification. Masterman 3 echoes this but also adds that juridification covers 'the increased propensity of individuals and groups to see courts as the appropriate forum for the resolution of social disputes, and perhaps even simply an increased use of legal terminology in discourse'.
Blichner and Molander take this further. 4 They admit that juridification is an ambiguous concept, but they argue, like Heery and Noon above, that it is a process; it is something that increases over time. If the process is reversed, there is dejuridification. They also argue that juridification has five dimensions. Their first dimension is what they call constitutive juridification, when a legal order is established, that is when an institution is obliged to follow certain rules that are precisely stated and where the final judgment is made by a third party. The second dimension of juridification is when an activity is subjected to legal regulation. The third dimension of juridification is when conflict is increasingly resolved by reference to law. The fourth dimension is increased judicial power. The fifth dimension is what they call legal framing; when there is a legal culture, and this implies a normative element. The expanded definition of Blichner and Molander is adopted here.
Background
In the first half of the 20 th century, trade union membership increased substantially from two million in 1900 to over nine million in 1950 5 and the trade unions campaigned to obtain statutory protection against tort liabilities invoked by employers to limit industrial action. In the main, trade unions were able to keep the courts from intervening in labour relations and to resolve workplace disputes and grievances through collective bargaining and the implicit threat of industrial action. Moreover, trade unions' preference for collective bargaining at that time was demonstrated, according to Dickens et al, 6 by a Trades Union Congress survey in 1961 which found that the majority of affiliated unions preferred questions of dismissal to be regulated by collective bargaining, not legislation. 10 Many reasons have been given for this decline in trade union density, including changes in the composition of the British economy, 11 but a significant factor has been the legal curbs on British trade unions and the right to strike. 12 At the same time, from the 1960s the law, in the form of worker's individual statutory rights, has become increasingly salient in employment relations. The first major right for workers, the right to claim unfair dismissal, was introduced under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 following a recommendation from a Royal
Commission aimed at reducing the number of strikes arising from dismissals, 13 and reenacted under subsequent legislation when the 1971 Act was repealed,
There then followed a raft of new rights for workers in the 1970s, partly as a result of initiatives taken by the Labour government and partly as a result of the United Kingdom joining the European Union. In the 1970s these included a worker's right to maternity pay and leave, not to be discriminated in employment on the grounds of sex, marital status, race and ethnic origin, to have equal pay irrespective of gender, to be given an itemised pay statement and time off for trade union duties. In the succeeding decades, workers were given further statutory rights, for instance not to be discriminated on grounds of disability and later on grounds of age, sexual orientation and religion or belief, to have certain limits on working time and to be paid the minimum wage. 14 As a result, increasingly workplace disputes were less likely to be resolved by trade unions at the workplace and claims to employment tribunals increased significantly, from 13,555 in 1972 (the year in which the right not to be unfairly dismissed was introduced) 15 to 192,000 in 2012-13.
16
In summary, collective regulation has significantly declined in the last 50 years, while workers' statutory rights have significantly increased and these two factors, taken together, have generated an upsurge in claims to employment tribunals. As a result, these tribunals have become increasingly prominent, although as we will see, this prominence was not obvious when they were first established.
Early years
The origins of industrial tribunals (as Britain's employment tribunals were called until 1998 17 ) are 'shrouded in silence, if not in mystery'. 18 They were 'children of civil servants'
and not created at the request of employers, unions or political parties. 19 This is unlike the position in France and Germany where trade unions were instrumental in the establishment of labour courts. 20 From the end of World War 2, however, specialist tribunals in other areas had proliferated, so the decision to establish an employment tribunal to hear appeals against administrative decisions in the labour sphere, (rather than to require cases to be brought to the courts) was at least partially pragmatic, according to one of the first presidents of the employment tribunals:
[It] was partly due to the lack of lawyers of sufficient competence to man (sic) the judicial bench, to deal with the increase in judicial work, but enough competent lawyers could be found to be chairman of tribunals because they only had to deal with a narrow band of law and could quite quickly become expert in it. 21 Employment tribunals' original jurisdiction flowed from s. and employees arising from their contracts of employment or from any statutory claims they may have against each other in their capacity as employer and employee'. 27 The Commission did not propose that these so-called labour tribunals:
…. should be given the job of resolving industrial disputes … arising between employers or employers' associations and trade unions or groups of workers … Nor do we envisage any matters arising between trade unions and their members or applicants for membership should be within the jurisdiction of labour tribunals 28 In short, the Commission recommended that labour tribunals should not determine collective disputes, but they should determine all individual ones. In particular, the Commission recommended that they should adjudicate on its proposed right to claim unfair dismissal. As a result of that shift, employment tribunals became clearly distinguishable from other British tribunals, which continued as administrative tribunals. 29 In fact, from the 1970s, as noted above, successive, governments gave employment tribunals jurisdiction to hear an individual's statutory claims, and the number of these statutory claims mushroomed.
Tribunals versus courts
The seeds of juridification were planted at the start. Employment tribunals were from the outset part of the legal system, with a qualified lawyer in the chair, evidence given on oath, cross-examination and originally appeals being made to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court. Since 1972 there have been specialist appeal bodies at the first appellate level, the National Industrial Relations Court and then from 1976 to the present day the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Further appeals, however, could then, and can now, be made only to the higher, non-specialist civil courts: the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, formerly known as the House of Lords. As we will see below, this has influenced how employment tribunals have interpreted the law.
Nevertheless, some 50 years ago tribunals were seen as distinguishable from the civil courts and, a report to Parliament from a Committee, chaired by Lord Franks, specified when tribunals, as opposed to the courts, should be used. This report said:
… preference should be given to the ordinary courts of law rather than to a tribunal unless there are demonstrable special reasons which make a tribunal more appropriate, namely the need for cheapness, accessibility, freedom from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of a particular subject. 30 The Donovan Commission broadly echoed this, essentially adopting the Franks criteria, when recommending that employment tribunals, not the civil courts, should adjudicate claims of unfair dismissal. It said that industrial tribunals (as they were then called) should provide for the parties 'an easily accessible, speedy, informal and inexpensive procedure'. 31 The next part of this article traces the development of employment tribunals over the last half century, organising this first under the Franks/Donovan yardsticks and then going on to consider other matters.
Speed/expedition
Employment tribunals have become less expeditious over the years and, although the official metrics have changed and are not strictly comparable, nevertheless a broad picture emerges of less and less expedition. First, the time taken from lodging a claim to the hearing being held has increased and second, (although less dramatically) the duration of a hearing has increased. In 1978, 39 per cent of claimants said that the time elapsing from the claim to the hearing was less than 8 weeks. 32 In 1988, the then current performance indicator was that at least 60 per cent of cases heard should reach a hearing within 12 weeks of the claim being lodged. In 1997, the performance indicator was 85 per cent of cases to a first hearing within 26 weeks. 'This was achieved and frequently exceeded virtually everywhere outside London, where the rate was much lower'. 33 In the first quarter of 2014 the mean time from a single claim being accepted to a final judgment was 34 weeks. 34 As to the duration of a hearing, in 1978, a survey found that 61 per cent of applicants and 51
per cent of respondent employers said that their hearing had lasted half a day or less. 35 In 1992, a survey found that '[t]he average hearing lasted between half a day and a whole day'. 36 In 2013, a survey found that the mean length was 1.5 days. 'One in five tribunal hearings lasted more than an hour but less than a day (20 per cent). A quarter lasted a day (26 per cent) and another quarter lasted two or more days (27 per cent)'. 37 In other words, there has been an increase in the length of hearings over the last 35 years.
Accessibility
One aspect of accessibility is location. respectively) could only be lodged on designated forms, which have grown from two pages 40 to 16 pages at the time of writing (2014) 41 . Moreover, claims can be rejected if not all the required information is provided, with the claimant being given the opportunity to resubmit.
In 2006-2007, 9 per cent of claims that were resubmitted were either not accepted or never resubmitted 42 , although this declined to less than one per cent in 2010-11. 43 The Government, however, introduced a new ground of rejection in 2013: if a claim is 'in a form which cannot sensibly be responded to…'. 44 In short, the ease of making a claim has been reduced considerably over the last half century.
Finally accessibility can be measured by the ease in which a claim is accepted by an employment tribunal. Before 1980, a claim could be lodged without any screening mechanism. From 1980, however, the government introduced a procedure of pre-hearing assessments to weed out unmeritorious claims, whereby a tribunal of its own motion, or at the request of one of the parties, could filter out worthless claims, for example because the The government amended this procedure in 1993, replacing pre-hearing assessments with pre-hearing reviews (PHRs) and deposit orders. At a PHR, if a judge, having considered written and any oral representations by the parties, decides that there is little reasonable prospect of success, he/she can require a party, who nevertheless wishes to proceed to a substantive hearing, to pay a deposit. The amount is set taking account of the party's means up to a limit. In 2013 PHRs were renamed preliminary hearings and the deposit limit was raised from £500 to £1,000 46 . Where a deposit order is made, and the party pays it rather than withdrawing, the substantive case is heard by a different tribunal, with the deposit refunded if that party wins.
Informality/freedom from technicality
From the outset until today, employment tribunals have been more informal than the 'ordinary' courts. For instance then and now the adjudicator(s) do not wear robes, and strict rules of evidence do not apply; for instance hearsay evidence is admissible, although the tribunal might not put much weight on it. Moreover, the 2013 employment tribunal rules have for the first time as one of their overriding objectives (rule 2e), 'avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in their proceedings'.
Nevertheless, the contention of this article is that little by little employment tribunals have become more formal and technical. First, their remit has become more intricate and technical.
As we have seen employment law has grown in scope and furthermore, 'is complex and often obscure'. 47 This expansion of employment law is mirrored in a compendium of employment law (which despite its size is called a 'Handbook'). unrepresented. 63 Recently, however, Adler found that the representation premium was only 3 per cent.
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Expert knowledge
As we have seen industrial tribunals, as they were then called, were set up under the Industrial Training Act 1964 to adjudicate complaints about levies on employers for training and from the outset they were constituted on a tripartite basis at a time when there was already a long tradition of tripartite structures to resolve employment issues. During World War I there were Munitions Tribunals with a legally qualified chairperson and two wing members, one drawn from a workmen's (sic) panel and one from an employers' panel, essentially to deal with an individual's labour mobility and compensation. Appeals were to the High Court, where at judicial discretion there could be two assessors, worker and employer. 65 After World War I the Industrial Court was established, though despite its name it was not a court in the usual sense, but rather a standing tripartite arbitration tribunal. As to decisions by employment tribunals, a very large percentage of three person decisions were and are unanimous. 72 Whether one regards this positively as the tribunal acting in a spirit of compromise, or whether one regards it negatively with the lay members becoming quasi-judges, not representatives of a 'side' and unable or unwilling to impose their own views about standards of conduct in the labour market (for instance in respect of unfair dismissal), depends on one's perspective. 73 Be that as it may lay members' employment relations knowledge is general and tacit, not particular, as they have never been matched to the sector from which they come and indeed any matching has been criticised by the appellate court 74 . Yet perhaps paradoxically, their presence has often been praised. For instance in a report to the government on the tribunal system Leggatt commented that Supreme Court Judge has praised lay members 76 , as has Baroness Ashton 77 .
Praise aside, one must ask what lay members contribute specifically. There is survey evidence that they contribute to the process: providing general workplace experience, giving parties' confidence because decisions are reached by three people, not one, and ensuring a balance between legal and workplace perspectives 78 . Furthermore there is evidence from interviews with the representatives of claimants and respondents that representatives valued their presence because they were able to reassure the parties that it would not just be a lawyer who would be deciding their case 79 .
Nevertheless, despite this evidence, lay members have step-by-step been excluded from hearing certain types of cases. Until 1993 the professional judge (that is the legally qualified chairperson) could only sit alone for very limited purposes such as interlocutory matters.
Otherwise all matters were determined by a tripartite tribunal (a professional judge and two provisions. In addition to the types of cases already mentioned, the professional judge became entitled to sit alone to determine interim relief applications, cases concerning written statements of employment particulars and itemised pay statements, and most recently, in April 2012 to adjudicate on unfair dismissal cases. 80 As a result of these changes, the professional judge sits alone in over two thirds of all cases. 81 This is a matter of particular concern in unfair dismissal. In such cases the tribunal has to decide whether the employer treated a potentially fair reason for dismissal as a sufficient reason 'in the circumstances' 82 . The Employment Judge, however, will usually have little knowledge of the workplace circumstances, unlike the lay members who in the main no longer sit on unfair dismissal cases. The government's justification of the 2012 change was financial. 83 In 1993 the government estimated that lay members cost £5 million per year, 84 but it has never been shown what amount of money has been saved by the exclusion of lay members from a jurisdiction.
In addition, all preliminary hearings (formerly Case Management Discussions and Prehearing Reviews) are now normally heard by the legally qualified person sitting alone, and these cover many a preliminary issue, for instance whether a person is an employee and is thus entitled to make a claim of unfair dismissal, whether a claim has been submitted within the time limits, and whether a person has a disability or a religion or belief and can thus claim discrimination on the grounds of one of these protected characteristics.
Meanwhile, the position of lay members has been undermined symbolically by the Tribunals, Regulations further added to the test with the phrase 'otherwise misconceived', although the word 'frivolously' was dropped. In 2013, while the circumstances in which a costs order must be made are unchanged, the scope for a tribunal to exercise its discretion and award costs in other cases could be said to have been increased. Similarly, there have been changes to the amount that can be awarded in unassessed costs: originally £500, then £10,000 and since 2013 £20,000. 87 Nevertheless, costs are only awarded in a minority of cases. For instance in 2012-13, costs were awarded from the claimant to the respondent in less than one per cent of claims accepted.
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Costs apart, for nearly their first 50 years, claimants could go to an employment tribunal and, if they self-represented, would not suffer any financial loss if they did not win their case. This changed dramatically in 2013 when for the first time fees were imposed and they are hefty.
For discrimination, unfair dismissal and whistleblowing claims, the fees at the time of writing (2014) are £250 to lodge a claim and a further £950 for a hearing. This, however, is reduced for claims in respect of redundancy payments and unpaid wages: £160 for lodging and £230
for a hearing. There is system whereby the fees can be remitted in full or in part, depending on a disposable capital test and a gross monthly income test. Between July when fees were first introduced and December 2013, just 600 claimants (24 per cent) of those applying for fee remission received all or partial remission. 91 Employment tribunal fees are more substantial than fees for the small claims court, where the fee depends on the money amount claimed; for instance £105 for a claim of £3,000 or less.
Enforcement
The awards made by employment tribunals are determined by the relevant legislation, whose contents are outside the scope of this article. 92 Suffice it to say that in the overwhelming majority of cases, if claimants are successful, they are awarded money, but the latest figures indicate that over half of the claimants awarded a pay-out following an employment tribunal hearing do not receive their award in full. 93 Enforcing awards is often a daunting process as employment tribunals (unlike the small claims court) do not enforce the monetary awards that they make. In England and Wales, individuals can pursue enforcement of their award through applying to their local county court for a fee of £40 for an enforcement order after which enforcement officers will seek to secure payment from the employer. In addition, in 2010, a fast track scheme was introduced to speed up and simplify the process of enforcing employment tribunal awards and Acas settlements by side-stepping the county courts and for a £60 fee applying to a High Court Enforcement Officer. Research in 2013, however, found that the introduction of the fast track scheme had not led to an increase in the number of claimants pursuing enforcement action.
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In Scotland, individuals wishing to enforce their tribunal award need to make an application to the tribunal office for an 'extract' of the award from the Secretary to the Tribunals and instruct the sheriff office to enforce it directly.
Discussion and conclusions
This article has shown that employment tribunals quickly became very different from other
British tribunals in that they morphed from administrative tribunals to bodies adjudicating party versus party disputes like the civil courts. Moreover, although tribunals were characterised 50 years ago as speedy, accessible, informal, expert and cheap, this article has shown how these yardsticks are essentially not applicable today. Compared to when they were established, employment tribunals are no longer cheap, as free access has been replaced by substantial fees to lodge a claim and have a hearing. They are no longer expert: expert lay members originally used to sit at every hearing, but they now only sit at a minority of hearings. They can no longer be described as informal given the increase in case law, legal representation and complex employment law. They are no longer as accessible as they were:
long claim forms have replaced simple letters. Moreover, as we showed above, they have moved from the side lines to centre stage in employment dispute resolution, in response to the growth of employment legislation and the decline of regulation by unions and employers jointly. In short, employment tribunals have become juridified over time.
To return to Blichner's and Molander's 95 five dimensions. The first is constitutive juridification when legal procedures and precise rules are stated, for instance a specified claim form, written witness statements, pre-hearing assessments which were replaced first by pre-hearing reviews and then by preliminary hearings. Their second dimension is when an activity is subjected to legal regulation, for instance laws on redundancy, unfair dismissal discrimination and working time. The third dimension is when conflict is increasingly resolved by law and this article has shown how the number of employment law claims has 98 Teubner submits that 'juridification is an ugly word -as ugly as the reality which it describes'. 99 Nevertheless, employers and trade unions do not necessarily agree. In 2001 the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) introduced a scheme to provide arbitration in respect of unfair dismissal as a voluntary alternative. Arbitration is more informal and often speedier than litigation in the employment tribunals; it is confidential, and there is finality as no appeal is allowed. Yet since its inception almost 15 years ago, Acas has only had some 80 cases. 100 Moreover, in the USA, where workplace arbitration is often used instead of litigation in the courts it is criticised, particularly in non-union settings where the paucity of process regulation can disadvantage the non-represented employee. 101 This article ends by critiquing the underlining basis of employment tribunals which is that the 'victim' asserts his or her rights to obtain redress after the breach of law has taken place.
Such a victim complains approach 'requires certain preconditions: awareness of rights;
knowledge of how to enforce them; capacity to claim (including financial capacity) and willingness to do so.' Trade unions can make members aware of their rights and help them to enforce them but, as shown above, unions have declined over the last 30 years.
without any consideration of an alternative enforcement approach, a state constituted labour inspectorate. Although there are examples elsewhere, for instance in France of labour inspectorates, Britain has never had an overarching one, with several inspectorates established at different points in time and each confined to a specific issue. 102 Until Britain introduces a comprehensive system of labour inspection, and such an inspectorate is adequately funded, employment rights are unlikely to be widely respected.
